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Abstract 
 The perennial status of peace and conflict dialogue in Africa has been 
very consistent. There is hardly any African States today that is not ridden 
with one form of internal conflict or the other. Some actions and inactions 
still have the possibility of generating more conflict in Africa. The possible 
missing link is that most African States (the leaders and the led) have not 
learnt the value of learning from history especially the causes and the effects 
of the Liberian Civil War on its economy, politics, social and citizenry.  The 
Liberian Civil War, which was one of Africa's bloodiest, claimed the lives of 
more than 200,000 Liberians and further displaced a million others into 
refugee camps in neighboring countries. Thus, this paper takes a critical look 
at the incidents of the Liberian Civil War with the intention of critically 
reflecting on both the internal and the external causes of the war and the 
countless number of internally displaced people. The paper, dwelling on 
extensive secondary data, exposes some hidden trajectory to the historical 
Liberian Civil War with the intention of providing the rest of the African 
States enough “food for thought” and also provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the causes and the background of displacement in Liberia.  
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Introduction 
 Liberia, at first glance, is a prime candidate for the status of a "failed 
state." In an article published in April 1994 by Influential Atlantic Monthly 
periodical, journalist Robert Kaplan voiced fears in Washington and 
elsewhere that Liberia and its troubled neighbour, Sierra Leone, are part of a 
European Scientific Journal February 2015 edition vol.11, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
336 
growing "zone of anarchy" where armed young men fight because they have 
little else to do. Kaplan attributes the collapse of political order to 
demographic and environmental stress. Moreover, weak state administrations 
are unable to manage rising popular expectations and the competition for 
increasingly scarce resources. He argues that cultural traits and ethnic 
diversity undermine government efforts to manage these pressures (William, 
1996).            
 As with any conflict, the causes and prolongation of Liberia’s first 
civil war that led to mass displacement of its civilian population is complex 
and controversial.  Sources differ on the relative influence of colonial, 
regional, and ethnic politics.  Meanwhile, certain factors with a particular 
bearing on the nature of displacement merit further discussion. 
  
External factors  
Regional Political Involvement   
           Regional involvement in Liberia predates the seven-year civil war.  
However, alliances with other West African governments and support to the 
NPFL rebellion from within neighbouring countries gave the conflict 
immediate regional dimensions.  The cross-border flow of refugees, along 
with fears of exported instability, heightened the involvement of 
neighbouring countries and made the displaced within and without the 
country an explosive political issue (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 112). The 
Liberian crisis had dominated the ECOWAS agenda, sidelining its main 
purpose of promoting economic cooperation across its membership.   
 
The Ghana Dimension 
          The nature and character of Ghanaian patronage and later dissociation 
from Charles Taylor during his search for refuge and support should be 
situated in the context of: (i) the internal political circumstances in Ghana; 
(ii) the nature of Ghana's relations with Liberia; and (iii) Ghana's search for 
regional allies (Tijissen. 1998: 6). In December 1981, the democratically 
elected government of Ghana was overthrown by a radical army group 
calling itself the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) under the 
leadership of Jerry Rawlings. In immediate post-1981 coup statements, the 
new government stated its desire to chart a radical revolutionary course, both 
internally and externally. The first major action undertaken by the PNDC 
(which has an interest for the present work) was to re-establish diplomatic 
relations with Libya which had been suspended by the previous government 
because of official anxiety concerning 'Libya's international terrorist 
campaigns (January 1992). Initial responses from ECOWAS leaders were 
cautious but varied as a result of the violent nature of Rawlings' earlier four-
month rule in June-October 1979 (Tijissen. 1998: 7-8).  
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           During the early 1980's, Liberia had consistently accused the 
Ghanaian government of subversion. Liberia's initial reaction to Ghana's 
declaration of a 'Holy war' was the immediate recall of its Ambassador from 
Accra in protest against the resumption of diplomatic ties with Libya (W.A, 
1982) Ghana-Liberia relations continued to deteriorate until Ghana's chargé 
d'affaires was eventually declared persona non grata in November 1983. This 
resulted in his eventual expulsion for 'activities incompatible with his 
diplomatic status' (November 1983). Liberia subsequently accused Ghana of 
backing an external invasion of the country in November 1985. It is in this 
context of Ghanaian-Liberian relations between 1982-1985, that Ghana's 
extension of patronage of Taylor's uprising should be situated. However, 
despite the facts surrounding these relations it is asserted that 'Ghana was 
one of the few supporters of the Doe coup in 1980. While it is probable that 
Rawlings was drawn to Doe because of their mutual alienation by other West 
African leaders, there is little doubt that their initial relationship benefited 
from the revolutionary ideas, which they both espoused. By the mid-1980's, 
however, a major ideological rift had occurred between both revolutionaries.  
              There is however a fundamental historical implausibility in this 
argument. Placing Ghana-Liberia relations in a historical context highlights 
the confusion surrounding the above point. Ghana's 'cautious optimism', to 
changes in Liberia was modified after the execution of TWP leaders, to 
reflect the general trend of hostility shown by regional states towards the 
PRC government. This resulted in endorsing both ECOWAS and the 
Organization of African Unity - OAU - criticism of the brutality of the take-
over, and the initiation of ECOWAS' punitive measures embracing three sets 
of interrelated gestures. First, the Foreign Minister, G. Baccus Matthews was 
prevented from participating in the Extraordinary OAU Economic Summit in 
Lagos, Nigeria, in April 1980. Subsequently, the new Defence Minister was 
not invited to a meeting of ECOWAS Defence Ministers in May 
1980.(Tijissen, 1998: 6). The height of collective regional abhorrence 
towards the new regime was reserved for the President.  Samuel Doe was 
refused participation in ECOWAS' Heads of States and Government summit 
in Lome, Togo, in May 1980.        
           By the time Ghana's own revolution occurred on 31 December 1981, a 
conservative turn of events leading to major reorientations in foreign policy 
had occurred in Liberia. The Libyan People's Bureau was closed and the 
Soviet Union told to reduce its diplomatic staff.  Liberia ultimately re-
affirmed its traditional ties to the US. This led to an internal power struggle 
in the cabinet in which the radical faction of the PRC was purged. Liberia 
was subsequently selected by the U.S. as one of twelve international bastions 
against the spread of communism and was to receive support from a special 
security assistance programme.  
European Scientific Journal February 2015 edition vol.11, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
338 
            Ghana's decision to support Charles Taylor, then, apart from the 
regime's stated democratic revolutionary credentials, can probably be 
inferred from the nature of relations between Ghana and Liberia. According 
to the Influential Weekly, West Africa, '... The present Ghana government 
has no love for ... Doe (W.A, 1990). During the 1980's, Doe perceived 
Ghana as unfriendly, frequently accusing Ghana of supporting 'dissidents' 
seeking to overthrow his regime'. It can be argued that, though the initial 
Liberian responses to Ghanaian changes were much more severe than the 
general regional response, they reflected widespread regional indignation 
with events in Ghana.  
           Byron Tarr and Prince Acquaah (Tijssen, 1989) asserted that, though 
Charles Taylor's initial feelers to the Ghanaian government were positively 
received, this altered over time, resulting in Taylor being incarcerated twice 
in Ghana. Diverse explanations have been offered. Though at this point, the 
essence of these imprisonments was lost on all major actors in this fledging 
struggle to lead the exiled opposition movement to resist the Second 
Republic, it is crucial for the later arguments and the subsequent escalations 
in the Liberian conflict that it comprehends the dynamics of this seemingly 
unimportant episode. The incidents are also particularly important in several 
contexts. They reflect: (i) the nature of regional politics and   alliances in 
addition to the initial introduction of the fledging Liberian opposition to 
Libya; and (ii) these incidents' influence on the character of ECOWAS' 
original response to the accelerating conflict. 
           With respect to Ghanaian rationales for breaking with Taylor, by 
1987, Taylor had obviously become a political and security liability as a 
result of the increasingly attentive Ghanaian youth audience fascinated by 
the revolutionary charisma and romanticism of Charles Taylor's rhetoric. 
Situating such youthful political consciousness within the context of the 
internal political climate in Ghana in 1987, it can be argued that Taylor, in 
the eyes of the Ghanaian authorities, had become a political and security 
liability. According to a defected Ghanaian intelligence officer; 'there were a 
number of Ghanaian dissidents [willing to] fight alongside Taylor in Liberia. 
Rawlings was worried that if Taylor triumphed, Liberia would be used to 
launch armed attacks against Ghana (N.A, 1987).  
           There is the plausibility of yet a more substantive motivation for 
Ghana's change of strategy. Ghana's revolutionary rhetoric on the regional 
level and close alliance with Libya and Burkina Faso had led to consistent 
regional accusations against both Ghana and Burkina Faso for supporting 
regional destabilization efforts generally, and especially against Togo (W.A, 
1987).  Ghana's increasingly weak and isolated position in terms of regional 
criticism for harbouring dissidents and consistent condemnation had, by 
1987, made her a regional pariah state. During an incident concerning 
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alleged Ghanaian complicity in an invasion of Togo, Nigeria, Togo's close 
regional ally during this period condemned Ghana as the ‘scourge of 
international terrorism' (W.A, 1987).  
 
The Burkinabe Factor  
           Report had it that in 1987 Taylor approached the Embassy of Burkina 
Faso in Accra and requested assistance to overthrow Doe ... Madam 
Mamouna Quattara, a client of Captain Blaise Compoare, received Taylor's 
written proposal (Tijssen, 1989: 8-9). Ghana chose to release Taylor into the 
custody of Blaise Compoare. Soon after these incidents, the Burkinabe Head 
of State, Thomas Sankara, was assassinated. Accordingly, 'Compoare, new 
leader of Burkina Faso, introduced Taylor to the Libyans'. Another 
perspective relates to Taylor's Accra sojourn and search for international 
backing. The late Thomas Sankara, leader of Burkina Faso ... secured 
Charles Taylor's release from Ghana. He was then deported and left for 
Burkina Faso where he stayed before going to Libya ((Tijssen, 1989: 9).                     
The close relations between Ghana and Burkina Faso can be situated in the 
post-1982 period when Burkinabe infatuation with Ghana and Libya 
increased. In an increasingly unstable West African region in the early 
1980's, it is believed that the conservative leaders of Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, and Togo were incensed by the Burkinabe Prime Minister's 
revolutionary rhetoric and close contacts with Ghana and Libya. Thus, 
through their French and Ivorien contacts, it was ensured that the Prime 
Minster was removed from power ((Tijssen, 1989: 8). A rapid change of 
fortune occurred when Sankarists took over power in August 1983. Thomas 
Sankara's government, characterized by pan-Africanist fervour and 
revolutionary rhetoric, alienated West African leaders who found Burkinabe 
and Ghanaian brands of radical pan-Africanism untimely. Most regional 
leaders believed that Ghana and Burkina Faso were instrumental in attempts 
to overthrow their governments. Other perspectives can explain the 
apparently hostile reaction of regional leaders to both Ghana and Burkina 
Faso.  
           Any analysis of the nature of international support for the NPFL 
should also consider the role of two other West African countries, apart from 
Burkina Faso and Ghana, in the initial organizing stages - Côte d'Ivoire and 
Libya. In addition, there was a motley group of individual West African 
nationals who came primarily from Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea 
and Sierra Leone. Understanding the rationales for Burkinabe patronage for 
the NPFL especially in the post-Sankara period is best understood through 
the prism of internal and regional politics. Apart from the earlier mentioned 
initial contact to the Libyans, the Burkinabes provided training facilities and 
troops estimated at 400 men, a position justified by Burkinabe leaders as 
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'moral duty' and 'moral support' extended to the NPFL (Tijssen, 1989: 9-10). 
A conceivable logic behind dispensing political and military patronage to the 
NPFL, could be NPFL complicity in the power struggles between Sankara 
and Compaore and an active NPFL role in the subsequent death of Sankara 
(Tijssen, 1998: 9) . 
 
 
The Libyan and Ivorian Elements 
            A critical analysis is also important for any appreciation of the 
dynamics of the unholy alliance comprising Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and 
Libya for the NPFL insurgence. This has been characterized as 'a particularly 
strange alliance of forces' (Tijssen, 1998: 9) .There has been controversy 
concerning the entry of Libya into this typical West African crisis. The 
Libyan factor in the Liberian crisis has been interpreted by arguing that 
Blaise Campaore, who had close affiliation like his predecessor, Sankara, 
with the revolutionary government of Libya, influenced the Ghanaian 
authorities to release Taylor into his guardianship. This stands in 
conspicuous contradiction to the explanations presented by Prince Eric 
Acquaah (Tijssen, 1998: 9). Who claims that the late Thomas Sankara, leader 
of Burkina Faso, was instrumental in securing the release of Charles Taylor 
from jail in Ghana.  
             The political foci of Ivorian motivation for supporting the NPFL are 
more varied and complex. The essence of such extensive patronage as 
encompassing personal, economic, ideological and military factors were 
critical to the Ivorien decision to provide sanctuary, weapons, conduit, 
finance and diplomatic support for the NPFL.  
            One of the most critical factors for Ivorian extension of patronage to 
the NPFL could have been the Ivorian economic crisis resulting from the fall 
in commodity prices. By the early 1980's, a severe drop in commodity prices 
affecting especially cocoa and coffee created an urban crisis, which 
contributed to the growth of nationalist perceptions critical of Burkinabe 
migrants. The collapse of coffee prices was particularly critical for the 
Ivorian economy and national psyche. The resultant aftermath was a 
financial crisis in which growers did not earn enough to cover labour costs. 
This indirectly led to the rise of xenophobia against Burkinabés. The 
combination of these two issues: the contemporaneous fall in commodity 
prices and the increasing sense of xenophobia generated conditions of 
apprehension for Burkinabe men. In a desperate act of survival and 
realpolitik, both states chose to support the NPFL in the hope of diverting 
domestic attention from the critical internal crises faced by both 
governments. 
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            Another crucial factor that is normally overlooked in the analysis of 
Ivorien support for the NPFL is closely related to what has been described as 
'French appetite for African territory' (Tijssen, 1998: 10). resulting from 
Paris' willingness to exercise military power to procure land in the previous 
century. French strategy for territorial possession resulted in the acquisition 
of parts of Maryland County in 1892, followed by more land around the 
Makona river in 1907 (Willi, 1973). Thus, when Liberian indigenes finally 
took over power in 1980, there were expectations for Liberia to pursue 
efforts at reclaiming territory lost in the previous century. The PRC's initial 
response was an understandable reluctance to pursue a narrow irredentist 
policy of reclaiming lost indigenous territory.  This position was to change, 
however, as the internal situation in Liberia worsened.  In a Liberia where 
the Second Republic faced increasing internal and international criticism 
over the failed re-civilization programme, added to the worsening economic 
and human rights conditions, there was a desire among policy makers to find 
an excuse to divert public attention and arouse renewed sympathy and 
support for the PRC by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Desperate to 
arouse nationalist backing for government's policies, the cabinet met to 
discuss 'modalities of militarily recapturing territories lost to France. The 
focus was on the Ivory Coast' (Posen, 1993).  
            Thus, to reduce a possible incidence of fighting a protracted border 
war at a time when Ivorien commodity prices had crashed, in the political 
and geo-strategic calculations of the Côte d'Ivoire government, backing an 
insurgency sympathetic to Ivorian aspirations to maintain their colonially 
inherited boundaries was found a much more prudent approach than dealing 
with the machinations of an increasingly erratic Liberian Second Republic.  
 
Internal Causes  
Long Years of Liberian-American domination of Liberia Politic 
          For 133 years after independence, the Republic of Liberia was a one-
party state ruled by the Americo-Liberian dominated True Whig Party 
(TWP). The True Whig Party dominated all sectors of Liberia from 
independence until 1980.  In the presidential election of May 1951, women 
and indigenous property owners voted for the first time, but the few thousand 
Americo-Liberians living in the coastal region still retained control of the 
government. The incumbent William V. S. Tubman, candidate of True Whig 
Party, was reelected without opposition. The government had suppressed the 
Reformation and United People's parties.   
           Under President William R. Tolbert's leadership during the 1970s, 
Liberia loosened its close ties with the United States. In 1974 it accepted 
economic aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and in 
1978 it joined with other developing countries in a trade agreement with the 
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European Community. Domestically, emphasis was placed on bringing the 
isolated interior into national political life and on improving the economic 
conditions of the indigenous population.  
             In 1979 the country was paralyzed by riots caused by a proposed 
increase in the price of rice, the staple food.  More than 40 people were 
killed in the violence.  (Ellis, 1995: 167).       One of the factors that drove the warlords to reject a transition to normalcy was their exploitation of Liberia's natural resources. Once the war started, Taylor found wealth, and the war was increasingly about maintaining that fortune. 
The warlords were wantonly exploiting their country's resources to keep 
themselves and their ragtag forces in weapons with virtual impunity, and in 
some cases complicity.  The primary sources of revenue for these warlords 
were Liberia's diamonds, timber, rubber, gold, and iron ore. Timber and 
rubber are among Liberia's main export items. Liberia earns more than $85 
million and more than $57 million annually from timber and rubber exports, 
respectively (Allen, 1999: 367-384). Alluvial diamond and gold mining 
activities also account for some economic activity.    
 
Tensions among the Coastal Indigenous Liberians  
          Liberian history reveals a consistent inequality between coastal elites 
and indigenous populations, through a succession of exploitative 
arrangements.  Writing on the political history of Liberia, Amos Sawyer 
traces the emergence of such inequality through “institutional arrangements 
in which a Western-style, unitary form of government prescribed by a 
written constitution was imposed upon a settler-derived patrimonial authority 
structure and the various forms of patrimonial and clientelist arrangements of 
the indigenous societies (Sawyer, 1992). 
               The emergence of autocracy, according to Sawyer, was sealed by 
the increasing personalization of authority in the president throughout the 
twentieth century. The postwar administration of Tubman and Tolbert 
perfected the sham of representative government; the state was run more as a 
family business (Sawyer, 1992). Doe’s rebellion replaced political autocracy 
with military tyranny built around his ethnic group (Krahn). This did nothing 
to reverse the fortunes of other indigenous groups and soon made their 
conditions worse.  
 
The Doe Factor 
          After the euphoric and popular reaction to the emergence of the 
military upon the Liberian political scene, the People's Redemption Council 
[PRC], headed by Samuel Kanyon Doe, failed to fulfill initial post-coup 
d'état promises of establishing a 'new society'. Instead of implementing 
policies of inclusion, political procedures were initiated which established 
patterns of ethnic seclusion. One result of this restrictive official strategy was 
the formation of a broad-based coalition of indigenous Liberians and foreign 
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insurgents under the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which 
aspired to depose Liberia's Second Republic (Frempong, 2002). 
 
Coup of 1980  
           In 1980 Tolbert's opponents, emboldened by a court decision 
recognizing them as an opposition party, openly called for his overthrow. 
Their leader, Gabriel B. Matthews, and a dozen others were arrested in 
March 1980.  
           On 12 April 1980, army personnel under the leadership of Master 
Sergeant Samuel K. Doe staged a bloody coup.  Doe's forces executed 
President William R. Tolbert. More than a dozen officials of the previous 
regime, mostly of Americo-Liberian descent, were publicly executed. A 
People's Redemption Council (PRC), headed by Doe, subsequently 
suspended the constitution and assumed fully legislative and executive 
powers. Americo-Liberian political domination ended with the formation of 
the People's Redemption Council. Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe was an 
indigenous Liberian from the Krahn ethnic group. The top coup leaders were 
Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, who was announced head of State; 
Sergeant Thomas Weh-Syen, Vice Head of State; and Sergeant Thomas 
Quiwonkpa, "Strongman of the Revolution" as Commanding General of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia.  
            Political parties remained banned until 1984. Elections were held on 
15 October 1985, in which Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia 
(NDPL) was declared winner. The period after the elections saw increased 
human rights abuses, corruption, and ethnic tensions (Frempong, 2002). 
            Doe's government increasingly adopted an ethnic outlook, as 
members of his Krahn ethnic group soon dominated political and military 
life in Liberia. This caused a heightened level of ethnic tension leading to 
frequent hostilities between the politically and militarily dominant Krahns 
and other ethnic groups in the country. The Doe regime was an 
extraordinarily brutal one that not only disenfranchised many Liberians, it 
also effectively erased the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate 
political action.  
 
Election and Coup Attempt – 1985 
             Thomas Quiwonkpa, a comrade of Samuel K. Doe in the 1980 coup, 
fell out with Doe. Some analysts suggested that both the power struggle and 
the personal conflict between Doe and Quiwonkpa were rooted in the 
cultural and traditional differences between the Krahn and Dan/Mano ethnic 
groups. General Quiwonkpa and close allies Prince Johnson and Charles 
Taylor, fled the country in November 1983 (Frempong, 2002). 
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            General Quiwonkpa went into exile to the United States, and many of 
his supporters, mainly, decommissioned security personnel, took refuge in 
neighboring Cote d'Ivoire where they began training to engage the Doe 
dictatorship. When the Gios and Manos of Nimba County - led by Jackson 
Doe and General Quiwonkpa -- ran into political conflict with the Krahn 
ethnic group – led by the President Samuel K. Doe -- the conflict was 
quickly taken over by individuals in the United States who did not belong to 
these tribes (Ellis, 1989: 180).  
             Under pressure from the United States and other creditors, in July 
1984 Doe's government issued a new constitution that allowed the return of 
political parties outlawed since 1980. The lifting of the ban on political 
activities on 26 July 1984 marked the beginning of a multi-party election 
campaign after more than four years of military rule in Liberia. Samuel Doe, 
the military Head of State, established a political party and presented his 
candidacy for the presidential elections.  Doe’s National Democratic Party of 
Liberia (NDPL) was a constituency composed of ethnic groups and 
individuals who were dependent on him, such as his own ethnic group [the 
Krahn] and the Mandingo people. Both groups were small and lacked 
political influence. Another component in his constituency was the Americo-
Liberian minority, which had been ousted from power in the April 1980 coup 
(Frempong, 2002). 
             On 12 November 1985, former Army Commanding Gen. Thomas 
Quiwonkpa invaded Liberia by way of neighboring Sierra Leone. 
Quiwonkpa almost succeeded in toppling the government of Samuel Doe. 
Members of the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia repelled 
Quiwonkpa's attack and executed him in Monrovia. Others were put on trial, 
and many were summarily executed. Doe's government launched a bloody 
purge against the Gio and Mano ethnic groups in Quiwonkpa's Nimba 
County, raising alarm about genocide against the Gio and Mano. Taylor, who 
was related by marriage to Quiwonkpa, benefited from the alienation of the 
Nimba population, which later became willing recruits to his cause. Mano-
Gio perceptions of the Mandingo alliance with the Doe regime put 
Mandingos in the category of the enemy at the time of the attempted 1985 
coup. After the failed coup attempt, the Mandingos were accused of 
complicity in the anti-Mano/Gio witch hunting. The Mandingos did not 
accept responsibility for the perceived persecution of the Mano and Gio 
people during Doe's regime.  The ruling National Democratic Party of 
Liberia captured 73 out of 90 seats in the National Assembly election of 15 
October 1985, but some opposition members refused to occupy their seats. 
The remaining opposition members were expelled from their parties in 1986. 
All of the vacant seats were captured by the NDPL in the partial election in 
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December 1986 (Sawyer, 1980: 19-21). Consequently, the National 
Assembly was without opposition in the end of 1986.  
 
Discontinuation of America aids and support  
           American aids spending on sub-Saharan Africa were at high levels 
through the mid-1980s due to the global competition with the Soviet Union. 
As the competition with the Soviet Union began to fade, and as efforts to 
reduce the US budget deficit intensified, there were overall reductions in 
assistance to the region. Policymakers increasingly focused on human rights 
and economic reform performance in making decisions on aid allocations. 
Aid to some African countries that had been major Cold War aid recipients -- 
notably Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Liberia, was 
sharply reduced. The reductions took place almost entirely within the 
security-oriented programs: military assistance and especially the Economic 
Support Fund (ESF).  
 
Factionalization of Conflict 
         The factionalized nature of conflict along ethnic lines has had a marked 
effect on the patterns of displacement and the potential for re-establishing 
people’s homes and livelihoods.  Doe added to the brutal repression of his 
opponents by surrounding himself with appointees from his Krahn group, 
ensuring that future conflict (and revenge) would fall along ethnic lines.  
Rival power groups, at least initially, launched themselves from ethnic areas 
of support, starting a chain of violence and retribution that continues (Cohen 
& Deng, 1998: 110). In particular, the Gio-Mano groups were fertile grounds 
for Taylor’s rebellion, having been the focus of reprisals following the failed 
coup attempt on Doe in 1985.  Although not ethnically discrete, the main 
factions divide along the ethnic lines. 
 
The Militarization of Civil Society 
            Although throughout its history, Liberia has experienced episodic 
violent insurrection, violence has increased as the norm for the settlement of 
disputes since the early days of the Doe regime.  Prolonged U.S. military 
assistance clearly provided Doe with the hardware to take oppression to a 
new level of  violence.  Human Rights Watch (Cohen & Deng, 1998: 111), a 
U.S. organization, has prepared a series of well-documented human rights 
violations.  These reports catalogue the widespread involvement and 
targeting of civilian populations in factional and associated violence. 
Children, denied basic rights let alone those enshrined in international law 
(through the Convention on the Rights of the Child), have been schooled in 
the ways of the warlords. Alienated from traditional rural livelihoods, with 
unreal expectations of the urban society to which they drifted, the 
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uneducated youth have been an easy recruiting ground for lawless gangs 
posing as militia.  Making a living through the barrel of a gun has become a 
norm. 
 
The Civil War of 1989-1996 
           The Liberian Civil War, which was one of Africa's bloodiest, claimed 
the lives of more than 200,000 Liberians and further displaced a million 
others into refugee camps in neighboring countries (USDS, 1997). Elections 
were scheduled for 1991. But late in 1989, severe communal violence broke 
out after a failed coup attempt against Doe. Several hundred members of the 
Gio and Mano tribes, that had been ill treated by Doe, revolted in the 
northeast.  
           On December 24, 1989, a small band of Libyan-trained rebels led by 
Charles G. Taylor, invaded Liberia from the Cote D’voire. Taylor, Doe's 
former procurement chief, is an Americo-Liberian of both indigenous and 
Americo-Liberian ancestry. Liberian troops and provincial security forces 
were dispatched to Nimba County to counter the insurgency and 
indiscriminately killed Liberian civilians without regard to the distinction 
between combatants and noncombatants. In response to this insurgency, 
President Doe launched an unrelenting wave of violence against the 
inhabitants of Nimba County. Media reports and international human rights 
organizations estimated that at least 200 persons, primarily members of the 
Mano and Gio ethnic groups, were killed by troops of the Government of 
Liberia during the counterinsurgency campaign (Amnesty International, 
1996). 
          When the cold war was over and Charles Taylor's band of rebels-- 
some of them children – clashed with Government forces and other ethnic 
militias in the streets, the resulting conflict was so frighteningly gruesome 
that for many it was almost impossible to understand. Between December 
1989 and mid-1993, Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) was estimated to have been responsible for thousands of deliberate 
killings of civilians. As NPFL forces advanced towards Monrovia in 1990, 
they targeted people of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, both of 
which the NPFL considered supporters of President Doe’s government 
(USIRC, 1993).  
             Although the sources of the Liberian conflict were complex, on one 
level it represented an attempt by Americo-Liberians to re-establish 
themselves as the dominant political force in Liberia. The war in Liberia was 
not about tribes seeking dominance over one another. Charles Taylor led the 
invasion into Liberia in the name of trying to right the wrong for the Gios 
and Manos. This was the motivator for the two ethnic groups who joined the 
movement. When the Taylor rebels entered Nimba County, their home, the 
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conflict quickly drew in the Mandingoes, who are mostly Muslims. The Gio 
tribe soon formed their own separate rebel forces under Prince Johnson, and 
a bloody three-way civil war began (Minear, Colin & Thomas, 1996: 47-50).     
As the fighting escalated into civil war, three distinct factions became 
engaged in a national power-struggle: forces loyal to Doe, and two mutually 
opposed rebel groups led by Charles Taylor and Prince Yormie Johnson. 
Taylor, a former Doe aide, and Johnson had started their campaign under the 
same banner, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Tribal 
affiliations played a key role in the split between the Krahn, to which Doe 
and most of his adherents belonged, and the Gio and Mano people, who 
formed the bulk of the rebel forces. Fighting between Doe’s troops and the 
Taylor/Johnson axis began at the end of 1989. Johnson assumed the 
presidency temporarily during September 1989, after which it passed through 
several hands, settling for a time in those of Amos Sawyer, who managed to 
pacify some parts of the country.             
             Barely 6 months after the rebels first attacked, they had reached the 
outskirts of Monrovia and Liberia was marked by intermittent civil war. 
Although many Liberians were glad to see Doe's repressive regime removed, 
no group that emerged from the civil war was powerful enough to replace the 
Doe government. As a result, the Republic of Liberia was plunged into a 
state of chaos. Despite a cease-fire agreement signed in Bamako, Mali, in 
1990*, the civil war never really ended. 
           Prince Yormie Johnson formed the Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (INPFL). Johnson's forces captured and killed Doe on 
September 9, 1990.  
          The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
intervened and succeeded in preventing Charles Taylor from capturing 
Monrovia. Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in 
Gambia under the auspices of ECOWAS in October 1990 and Dr. Amos C. 
Sawyer became President. Sawyer was backed by a Nigerian-led 
peacekeeping force, known as ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group). 
Taylor refused to work with the interim government and continued the war. 
The war spilled over into Sierra Leone in 1991, when Foday Sankoh led a 
mixed group of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans into Kailahun in eastern 
Sierra Leone. President Momoh's troops attempted to train a fighting force 
from among the 250,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone (USRC, 1992:1). 
The ex-Liberian Broadcasting Corporation head, Alhaji Kromah, organised 
Mandingo Muslims and Krahn refugees in Freetown to form the United 
Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) (Le, Monde, 1992: 6).  
            The Krahns and Mandingoes became the direct targets of Taylor's 
NPFL group. In neighboring Sierra Leone, refugees of these two tribes led 
other tribes in organizing the ULIMO faction and returned to Liberia.  It was 
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this group in 1992 that helped the West African ECOMOG peacekeeping 
force stop the takeover of Monrovia by Taylor’s NPFL rebels.  
           With the escalation of violence that began in August 1992 it seemed 
as if even the limited peace Liberia possessed had been completely shattered. 
The re-emergence of overt civil war threatened to return Liberia to the state 
of terror and brutality that prompted Africa Watch monitors to call Liberia a 
"human rights disaster.(African Watch, 1990:1). By 1992, several warring 
factions had emerged in the Liberian civil war [all of which were later 
absorbed in the new government].  
            In January 1993 a security buffer around Monrovia was re-
established by forces of the West African Peace Monitoring Group. The 
authority of the interim government never extended beyond Monrovia's 
suburbs. ECOMOG defended the city, which became a civilian safe haven 
with as many as a million people at some points (USCR, 1992: 9).   
           Taylor and his NPFL guerrillas – mostly from the Gio and Mano 
peoples who are historic rivals of the Krahn – kept fighting. To complicate 
matters further, at least three new guerrilla formations appeared as both 
Taylor’s NPFL and its main opponents split into factions. A peace accord 
signed in the Beninois capital, Cotonou, in 1994 was quickly forgotten.  
            During the first week of April 1996, the failure of the Council of 
State to resolve internal power struggles led to a resumption of fighting in 
Monrovia.  In April 1996, the Liberian Council of State sent police-militia to 
arrest Prince Johnson on murder charges. As a direct result, fighting erupted 
in Monrovia between 'government forces' and LPC, AFL and ULIMO-J 
fighters loosely allied under Johnson and based at Barclay Training Centre. 
Johnson's forces took 600 civilians as 'human shields'. Some 1,500 people 
were killed in the clashes that lasted seven weeks (Kpatindé, 1996).  
 
The Length  of Conflict 
           All of the above factors have been exacerbated by the duration of the 
conflict, which effectively dated back to the Doe power coup of 1980.  In 
particular, the repeated failure of multiple peace agreements has thrown the 
country into a debilitating cycle of violence.  The internally displaced despair 
of regaining their former lives, and refugees have lost confidence that 
conditions will allow them to return.  Liberia appeared to be following a 
pattern of chronic instability set by other sub-Saharan countries such as the 
Sudan, Angola, and Rwanda, where civil conflict establishes a self-
generating equilibrium.  In essence, the economic interests in sustaining the 
conflict, embodied in well-armed militia, outweigh any counter forces (Scott, 
1998: 112). 
 
Conclusion 
European Scientific Journal February 2015 edition vol.11, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
349 
           These several factors – external and internal – explain the depth of the 
Liberian Civil War which current Africa States should beware of in order not 
to experience such a gruesome internal conflict again even though they have 
been several conflicts.  
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